This page describes MIND's memory checks, tested deterministic workloads, and evidence verification. Deployment assurance also depends on the selected compiler path, runtime, and application.
mindc can attach a tamper-evident trace_hash to compiled IR; signing is opt-in, needs both post-quantum legs, and is off by default.
Memory Safety
MIND uses scope-bounded regions and generation-checked references. RFC 0010 tracks the implemented checks and remaining phases; this is not a claim that every native path implements Rust's ownership and borrowing guarantees.
Region escape checks
Generation-checked references
Explicit unsafe boundaries
Implementation coverage
Deterministic Execution
The strict arithmetic profile preserves the defined operation order. Cross-substrate CI checks the committed workloads on x86_64 AVX2 and ARM64 NEON:
Integer and Q16.16 fixed-point
Strict floating point
Operation order
Replay inputs
Reproducible builds
Those three floating-point fixtures do not establish identity for every input, arbitrary vector reduction, transcendental function, or GPU workload. General floating-point and GPU coverage remains outside the shipped cross-substrate claim. See Determinism for the full tier breakdown.
Audit Trail Support
For regulated industries, MIND provides features to support audit and compliance:
Execution traces
Immutable IR
Artifact hashing
External logging
Compile-time Evidence Chains (RFC 0016)
mindc emits an evidence-chain epilogue on compiled IR, including a tamper-evident trace_hash.
Tamper-evident trace_hash
ShippedEmitted on compiled IR as part of the evidence-chain epilogue.
Signing
Signed (opt-in)Opt-in signing requires both ML-DSA-87 and SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s; both build features are off by default. mindc verify --signer-pubkey checks an operator-supplied trusted-key allowlist and rejects an unknown signer.
Published release keys and signed-reproduction CI
PlannedPublished release keys and signed-reproduction CI remain operational work.
A signature authenticates the signed claim; independent reproduction or a supported proof is still needed to establish the computation's correctness. The evidence fields include:
| Field | Holds |
|---|---|
| evidence_chain.determinism | class (e.g. byte-identical-q16) |
| evidence_chain.substrate | target (x86_avx2, arm64_neon, cuda_sm89, …) |
| evidence_chain.toolchain | compiler + flags identity |
| evidence_chain.trace_hash | SHA-256 of the canonical mic@3 binary IR (RFC 0016 GAP-1, re-anchored 2026-05-31) |
| evidence_chain.parent | optional pointer to the parent compilation |
The chain rides on a MAP epilogue (RFC 0014) attached to either canonical IR serialisation (mic@1 text or mic@3 binary, RFC 0021) and survives the load → execute → re-emit cycle. See ir-stability.md for the normative carrier contract.
Cryptographic Primitives (Pure MIND)
The standard library includes a crypto / TLS / HTTP primitive stack written entirely in MIND and verified against RFC and NIST known-answer tests:
| Area | Primitives |
|---|---|
| Symmetric & hashing | AES-128-GCM, SHA-256, HKDF, Keccak / SHA-3 + SHAKE (FIPS 202) |
| Public-key | X25519, RSA-PSS-SHA256 verify, ECDSA-P256 verify, ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203 post-quantum KEM) |
| Certificates | X.509 parsing and signature verification |
| TLS 1.3 | key schedule, record layer, Finished MAC, handshake crypto (RFC 8448 replay-verified) |
| HTTP/2 | HPACK header compression (RFC 7541) and binary framing (RFC 9113) |
Honest scope
This is a verified primitive library, not a working TLS client or server yet: there is no socket-driven handshake state machine or certificate-chain path validation, and HPACK is decode-only. The primitives are correctness-first, not speed-optimized.
Threat Model
The MIND security model assumes:
Trusted
Standard OS protections
Adversarial input
Out of scope
Sandboxing (Planned)
PlannedFuture versions will support optional sandboxing for untrusted model execution:
// Planned syntax
@sandbox(memory_limit: 1GB, time_limit: 10s)
fn untrusted_inference(input: Tensor<f32, N, M>) -> Tensor<f32, N, K> {
// ...
}Learn More
See the full security specification at mind-spec/security.md.